The Decline of Europe 02.09.2026
”— How about we nuke ‘em?
— Oh, we’ll definitely nuke ‘em! More than once! The whole world to dust! But later.”
(c) DMB (Russian cult comedy movie)
Beyond all the conspiracy theories, John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow raised a few truly critical topics. Specifically: the ongoing mobilization in Russia and the potential escalation of the conflict in Ukraine to a level where NATO countries get dragged in.
First, let’s talk about mobilization. Partial mobilization in Russia is currently underway pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 647, dated September 21, 2022. It was never rolled back; the decree remains in full effect. Under its framework alone, over 200,000 people were drafted into the Russian Armed Forces in 2026, bringing the total number of personnel called up over four years—including contractors and volunteers—to roughly 1,960,700. Meanwhile, Presidential Decree No. 526, dated July 27, 2026, set the authorized strength of the Russian military at 2,426,130 units.
What is happening along Russia's western borders is equally noteworthy. In 2022, the Western Military District was split into two: the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and the Moscow Military District (MMD). Within the LMD, the 44th Army Corps was formed in Karelia. Along the Estonian axis, motor rifle brigades within the 6th Combined Arms Army of the LMD were expanded into full divisions. The 11th Army Corps in Kaliningrad was also reinforced—specifically, the 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade was converted into a division. All of this, it is worth adding, is unfolding against the backdrop of an ongoing war of attrition in Ukraine.
Now for the genuinely bad news. Around 50,000 North Korean troops have either already been deployed to Russia or will be in the very near future. Make no mistake: this is just the beginning. Prior to this, North Korean forces had already participated in combat operations against Ukraine in the Kursk region. Even more intriguing news followed: in late June of this year, negotiations took place between Lukashenko and Xi Jinping, leading numerous analysts to speculate that Chinese troops could eventually deploy to Belarusian territory. Then, on July 24, came an even more explicit security statement: during a foreign ministers' meeting, China called for deeper security cooperation with Belarus. Immediately afterward, regular joint Chinese-Belarusian military exercises under the Swift Eagle series kicked off.
To sum up the big picture: Russia has more than doubled the size of its military compared to pre-2022 levels. Partial mobilization continues unabated. The North Korean military has actively entered the fray on Russia’s side. While the number of troops Pyongyang is currently prepared to dispatch to aid Moscow is estimated at 50,000, that figure could easily be scaled up to 500,000 or even a million. North Korea has plenty of soldiers to spare. Furthermore, China is cementing its military ties with Belarus—a partnership that could prospectively lead to Chinese military bases in the country. Similar talks are almost certainly taking place, if not already successfully concluded, with Russia itself.
What does all of this mean for Europe?
In short: nothing good on the horizon. Look at the balance of forces along the line of contact. Right now, it stands at roughly 1 to 1. Combined, NATO forces (the national armies of Poland, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, plus foreign NATO contingents stationed in these countries) total approximately 350,000 personnel, excluding mobilization reserves. Russia and Belarus currently deploy around 320,000 troops near these borders. In other words, if a military clash between Russia-Belarus and NATO were to break out today, NATO would easily hand Russia and Belarus a decisive military defeat—with Ukraine dealing an added blow.
But that is today. For Putin, launching a war against NATO right now would be suicide. This is due not only to a literal deficit of forces along the western frontier, but also to the military command itself. The Russian military today is essentially a poorly organized, ill-equipped rabble, led for years by various "Krivoruchko" who excelled at nothing beyond skimming 100% of the budgets and submitting glowing "victory" reports to the Kremlin. This dynamic was a major driver behind the Russian army’s 2022 disaster in Ukraine.
Beijing understands this perfectly. For a long time, the situation actually suited them, as Western sanctions effectively transformed Russia into a Chinese economic colony. However—just for show—the Chinese still went ahead and executed several of their own generals linked to Sergei Shoigu. Times, however, are changing...
A complete Russian defeat in Ukraine is currently unacceptable to China. It could trigger yet another Kremlin pivot from East to West, or worse, set off a systemic collapse of the country—leaving it entirely uncertain which faction would grab power where, or whose military bases we might end up seeing in Blagoveshchensk. To prevent this, the Chinese are directly interested in deploying their own troops on Russian and Belarusian soil, as well as ensuring the complete absence of any viable Russian opposition (an effort they are successfully pulling off in partnership with the FSB, SVR, and—oops—MI6). Therefore, we shouldn't expect an immediate strike against NATO or a similar flashpoint in the near future, unless there are active plans for a global partition of Russia. Personally, I doubt it, and here is why.
China doesn't need Russian territory right now; it is already extracting all the resources it needs from Russia for dirt cheap. China’s main objective is eliminating its primary geopolitical rivals: the United States and the European Union. Turkey isn't China's friend either, but to Beijing, Ankara is small fry. This is precisely where Russia comes in. Russia acts as a battering ram designed to strike the EU from the East, while uncontrolled migration detonates the EU from within.
Through a compromised segment of Western elites, China has long operated from the shadows—using "human rights funds" and various neo-Marxist organizations—to foster policy encouraging migration into Europe. Over the last decade, Russian and Belarusian intelligence services openly joined this effort, orchestrating an endless transfer of Iraqis, Pakistanis, Somalis, Syrians, and others into the EU across Europe's eastern borders. This issue has grown into a systemic crisis that will inevitably trigger a social explosion—one that Russian-backed right-wing populist parties in the EU, currently gaining serious political momentum in Germany and France, will help ignite. This entire process will take years. In the meantime, China needs a stable Russia that can be forged into one massive military fist aimed squarely at Europe.
What can we expect in Russia in the near future? I anticipate that partial mobilization will persist and likely accelerate. Russia will also incrementally beef up its troop footprint along its western borders. That said, declaring general mobilization in Russia right now makes no sense. Furthermore, we can soon expect the dismissal of General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov, with his replacement drawn from Defense Minister Andrey Belousov’s inner circle. Gerasimov remains the final pillar of the Russian army's legacy corruption model, effectively blocking many of Belousov's initiatives. Putin has kept Gerasimov around out of personal loyalty, as he allows Putin to retain direct personal grip over the Armed Forces.
However, caught between the threat of military defeat by Ukraine on one side and direct pressure from China on the other, Putin has no leverage left. In a relatively short span, many of the old mechanisms of systemic control based on personal loyalty (in exchange for total impunity) will vanish. This applies not just to the military, but to the economy, intelligence services, and beyond—shifts that are already very noticeable. Practically speaking, control over the country will shift away from the Presidential Administration toward the FSB and newly emerging pro-Chinese factions within the state apparatus. This transition is happening as we speak.
Finally, let us return to John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow on August 25 of this year. Against the backdrop of the current state of affairs, this visit was utterly pointless, yielding nothing beyond background noise. Following the complete collapse of the Anchorage talks a year ago, both the CIA and Donald Trump’s administration should have realized that no "freezing" or resolution of the Ukrainian conflict is happening under their current framework. As for mobilization, Russia’s partial draft continues, will only scale up, and will eventually be augmented by North Korean forces and, prospectively, PLA troops. The US is completely powerless to influence these developments under its current approach.
Lastly, regarding the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict onto EU territory and the eventual drawing-in of NATO: this, too, is inevitable, but on a longer timeline rather than immediately. Right now, the Kremlin merely rattles sabers at the EU and NATO through its media and talking heads because Moscow is genuinely incapable of confronting NATO militarily at this moment. However, as internal reforms take root within Russia and new global players openly take the field, the situation will shift radically over the next few years.
Dmitrii Ershov, Political Analyst.
Tags: Global Politics | John Ratcliffe | NATO | Partial mobilization in Russia